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NOTE

RESOLVING “RESOLVED”: COVENANTS NOT TO SUE AND
THE AVAILABILITY OF CERCLA CONTRIBUTION ACTIONS
Jacob Podell*
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)—as part of its dual goals of cleaning up hazardous-waste sites
and ensuring that the polluter pays for that cleanup—gives private parties
two mutually exclusive causes of action: cost recovery and contribution. Contribution is available in limited circumstances, including if the party has “resolved” its liability with the government. But CERCLA does not define this
operative term. Federal courts are split over how the structure of a settlement
resolves liability. Several courts follow Bernstein v. Bankert, which held that
any conditions precedent and nonadmissions of liability strongly suggest that
a party has not yet resolved its liability. The Ninth Circuit’s recent case,
ASARCO LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., said liability is resolved if the settlement determines the party’s obligations with “certainty and finality.”
Bernstein deviates from CERCLA’s text and policy, leading to serious inconsistencies in the interpretation and application of the statute. ASARCO injects uncertainty into the statute, which disincentivizes settlements. When the
stakes are the reallocation of billions of dollars and the amelioration of the
most notorious environmental disasters, getting it right is paramount. This
Note proposes a bright-line rule—liability is resolved when the settlement
contains any covenant not to sue, conditional or unconditional—and argues
that this reading cleans up many of the issues the current circuit split imparts
on the statute.
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INTRODUCTION
Four years after Congress thought it had closed environmental law’s
“last remaining loophole,” a chemical soup full of carcinogens began bubbling up in people’s basements in the Love Canal neighborhood of Niagara
Falls, New York. 1 In 1953, the local school board had bought what it knew to
be essentially a loosely covered dump of industrial waste from the Hooker
Chemical Company for one dollar. 2 After years of complaints of health problems, the problem reached crisis levels when heavy rains caused the toxins to
seep into people’s homes. 3 In August 1978, the State of New York declared a
public health emergency, with the federal government stepping in five days
later. 4 Over the next two years, around 1,000 people left their homes, and
most would never return. 5 Love Canal was by no means unique. For example, in the ominously named “Valley of the Drums,” a massive collection of
metal drums left in a field caught fire and burned for more than a week. 6 Or
take Times Beach, where road crews used the notorious carcinogen dioxin as
a dust suppressant. 7
Despite the 1970s being the “environmental decade” when Congress legislated the bulk of the modern-day environmental regulatory regime, it left
one gap. 8 It failed to address the pollution that predated these statutes. 9 Love

1. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P.
LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 409 (8th ed. 2018).
2. Alexander Nazaryan, Love Hurts, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www
.newsweek.com/2013/10/18/love-hurts-243690.html [https://perma.cc/HV96-JUC8].
3. See Colin Dabkowski, A History of the Love Canal Disaster, 1893 to 1998, BUFF.
NEWS (Aug. 4, 2018), https://buffalonews.com/2018/08/04/a-history-of-the-love-canaldisaster-1893-to-1998/ [https://perma.cc/R4GS-ZB6R].
4. Nazaryan, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, SIXTH FIVE-YEAR REVIEW REPORT FOR A. L. TAYLOR
(VALLEY OF THE DRUMS) SUPERFUND SITE, BROOKS, BULLITT COUNTY, KENTUCKY, at D-3
(2018), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/04/11111974.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN9U-TSFK];
Valley of the Drums, ATLAS OBSCURA, https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/valley-of-thedrums [https://perma.cc/K4QF-KRTS].
7. William Powell, Remember Times Beach: The Dioxin Disaster, 30 Years Later, ST.
LOUIS MAG. (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.stlmag.com/Remember-Times-Beach-The-DioxinDisaster-30-Years-Later/ [https://perma.cc/K2CN-9Z5J].
8. Jeffrey M. Gaba, The Private Causes of Action Under CERCLA: Navigating the
Intersection of Sections 107(a) and 113(f), 5 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 117, 121–22 (2015).
9. Id.

October 2020]

Resolving "Resolved"

207

Canal, Valley of the Drums, Times Beach, and a slew of other incidents generated the political pressure necessary to pass federal legislation closing this
gap. 10 However, the election of Ronald Reagan and the Republican takeover
of the Senate in 1980 left the Ninety-Sixth Congress mere weeks to pass any
legislation on the topic. 11 Thus, the legislative history is, at best, messy. 12
This rushed process resulted in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 13—a statute frequently
and colorfully ridiculed for its complexity and poor drafting. 14
With a set of amendments in 1986 known as the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), 15 CERCLA created a complicated
structure designed to effect two goals: (1) make sure hazardous-waste sites
are cleaned up in a timely manner and (2) make those who caused the contamination pay for the cleanup. 16 It addresses the first goal by authorizing
the federal government to clean up a site and then sue those responsible 17 or
compel those parties to clean up the site themselves. 18 In addition, it created
a tax on the chemical industry that would create a large fund to finance
cleanups. 19 “Superfund,” as this fund is commonly called, has become the
nickname for the whole statute. 20 The statute addresses the second goal by
allowing parties who pay for cleanup efforts beyond the harm they caused to
sue other polluters, which CERCLA calls “Potentially Responsible Parties”

10. See id. at 122.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 885 (9th Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (“Any inquiry into CERCLA’s legislative history is somewhat of a snark hunt.”). See
generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1 (1982)
(providing a comprehensive overview of Congress’s abbreviated consideration of CERCLA).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
14. See, e.g., CP Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assocs., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 432, 435
(D.N.H. 1991) (“[C]ourts seem to resort to . . . hoping that if they stare at CERCLA long
enough, it will burn a coherent afterimage on the brain.”).
15. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675). SARA, among other things,
clarified the scope of liability and cleanup standards, created new government settlement
authority, and created new private causes of action. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 713 (5th ed. 2016) (“[T]he generally proliability posture of SARA led some experts in the field to suggest that its acronym ought to be
changed to RACHEL, because the Reauthorization Act Confirms How Everyone’s Liable.”);
Gaba, supra note 8, at 122–23.
16. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009) (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005)).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
18. See id. § 9606(a).
19. See I.R.C. § 9507; Martina E. Cartwright, Superfund: It’s No Longer Super and It Isn’t
Much of a Fund, 18 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 299, 308 (2005).
20. See Superfund Liability, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY (updated July 18, 2019),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-liability [https://perma.cc/ZLB9-TTGX].
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(PRPs). 21 Parties that incur cleanup costs directly can bring “cost-recovery”
actions, while parties whose costs were imposed by a legal action can bring a
“contribution” claim. 22
One circumstance in which a party may bring a contribution suit is
when that party has already “resolved” its liability with the United States or a
state. 23 And now CERCLA’s poor drafting rears its head: What does “resolved” mean? For example, if the government agreed to not sue only on the
condition that the party completely finishes a cleanup (termed a “condition
precedent”), 24 is liability resolved if the cleanup is not yet finished? Essentially, the debate concerns how the structure of a settlement determines resolution of liability. Given the frequency of settlements 25 and the gargantuan
costs of cleanups, 26 resolving questions of liability in hazardous-waste cases
is of critical importance.
This Note proposes a bright-line rule to determine if a settlement resolves liability. Liability is “resolved”—and thus a contribution action is
available—if a settlement contains any covenant not to sue, conditional or
otherwise; a party’s failure to admit or deny liability is irrelevant to this analysis. Part I provides an overview of CERCLA’s structure—namely who is liable for what and how the causes of action to assign this liability interact. Part
II analyzes the circuit split created by this gap, concluding that both of the
leading approaches produce unsatisfactory results. Part III proposes the
bright-line rule described above and shows how that solution is consistent
with CERCLA’s text, overall statutory structure, and policy objectives.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF CERCLA LIABILITY

CERCLA liability is complex and broad. The statute uses intricate pathways to make a wide range of parties liable for an even wider range of damages. 27 This Part provides an overview of how CERCLA’s liability provision
works. Section I.A outlines the statute’s basic liability structure and how the
government leverages that liability to effect cleanups, while Section I.B de21. See, e.g., ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2017).
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f).
23. Id. § 9613(f)(3)(B).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 60–67.
25. Gaba, supra note 8, at 124–25.
26. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Superfund Chaos Theory: What Happens When the Lower
Federal Courts Don’t Follow the Supreme Court, 6 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 151, 154 (2016)
(“Addressing remaining contaminated sites in the U.S. would cost up to one-quarter trillion
dollars, or an expenditure of $6-8 billion annually for forty years.” (footnote omitted)). Despite
these costs, there can be massive public health benefits. E.g., Justin R. Pidot & Dale Ratliff, The
Common Law of Liable Party CERCLA Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. 191, 196 (2018) (“[T]he EPA
estimates that the additional risk of cancer will decrease significantly from four in 1000 to
between one in 10,000 and one in 1 million people.”).
27. See Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENV’T L.J. 1, 6–8 (1993)
(“The CERCLA liability system has become a black hole that indiscriminately devours all who
come near it.” (footnote omitted)).
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scribes how CERCLA’s two causes of action function and interact with each
other.
A. The Parties Under CERCLA and Their Liabilities
Under CERCLA, there are multiple categories of parties that can be liable (the PRPs), several types of recoverable damages, and a plethora of ways
the government uses this liability to clean up hazardous pollution. This Section will walk through each one in turn.
First, who is liable under CERCLA? For a party to be liable, it must meet
the definition of “person” under the statute, which is easy given its broad
definition. 28 There are four types of “persons” who can be held liable as PRPs
under the statute. First, there are the current owners or operators of a hazardous-waste site. 29 The term “owner or operator” is, unhelpfully, defined as
“any person owning [or] operating” a facility or vessel. 30 Members of this
group are liable regardless of whether they actually caused the pollution. For
instance, the current owner of a landfill that spews toxic materials would be
designated as a PRP under the statute, even if it recently purchased the site
and played no role in creating the hazardous conditions. 31 The second category is past owners or operators. To be liable, the past owner or operator
must have owned or operated the site at the time the hazardous chemicals
were disposed of. 32 Members of the third group of PRPs, known as “arrangers,” 33 are liable if they paid or coordinated with someone else to dispose of
the waste. 34 “Arranging” requires an intent to enter the transaction for the
purpose of disposing of the hazardous substance. 35 The fourth and final category is transporters of hazardous wastes, but only if they had a role in selecting the site of disposal. 36

28. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (defining “person” to include: individuals, business entities,
municipalities, states, and even the United States).
29. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
30. Id. § 9601(20)(A)(i). This bit of “tautology” serves as just another example of
CERCLA’s poor drafting. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 56 (1998). Courts have
fleshed out the meanings of those words elsewhere. See id. at 66–67.
31. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)). To blunt this otherwise harsh result, Congress created a kind
of “due diligence” defense: a prospective property purchaser can avoid liability if they took
certain steps to identify contaminants and cooperate with cleanup activities if hazardous waste
is found. See Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 202.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
33. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 606–07 (2009).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
35. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 612 (“[K]nowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an
entity ‘planned for’ the disposal, particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of
the legitimate sale of an unused, useful product. In order to qualify as an arranger, [a PRP]
must have entered into the sale of [the hazardous substance] with the intention that at least a
portion of the product be disposed of during the transfer process . . . .”).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4); see also Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 202 n.52.

210

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:205

And what are they liable for? There are three categories of recoverable
costs from liable parties under CERCLA. First, PRPs are liable for the costs
of the cleanup. That liability is owed to any party that incurred costs as part
of the cleanup, including but not limited to the federal government, states,
and Native American tribes. 37 CERCLA uses the term of art “response” to
describe these cleanups, 38 which are divided into two types: removal actions
and remedial actions. 39 Both actions need to address a “release” of a “hazardous substance,” or the threat of one, into the “environment.” 40 As to the
difference between the two, removal actions are “ ‘those taken to counter
imminent and substantial threats to public health and welfare,’ while remedial actions ‘are longer term, more permanent responses.’ ” 41 Second, PRPs
must cover the cost of health assessments for, or public health studies of, the
people who might later suffer adverse health consequences from the toxic
substances. 42 Third, PRPs are liable for natural resource damages. 43 This
provision goes beyond response costs to cover damages to the environment
that remain once pollution is removed. 44 However, the scope of environmental damage can be quite difficult to quantify. 45 Notably, CERCLA does not
cover damages related to personal injury or property value, nor does it allow
successful plaintiffs to recover attorney or expert fees. 46
There are five ways that the government can get a site cleaned up at the
polluter’s expense under CERCLA. 47 The first two options involve going to
court first in order to secure a cleanup, while the last three involve cleaning
up or agreeing to do so before any litigation. As its first two options, EPA
can file an abatement action seeking to judicially enjoin a party to clean up,
or it may issue a Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) ordering the same,

37. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B).
38. ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2017).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)–(24).
40. Id. CERCLA defines all three of these operative terms quite broadly. For example,
the “environment” includes, basically, any water (navigable or otherwise), land (above or below
ground), or air under the jurisdiction of the United States. Id. § 9601(8); see also id. § 9601(22)
(defining “release” broadly to include spilling, leaking, or otherwise discharging any hazardous
substance into the environment). A notable exception to this broadness is that the definition of
“hazardous substance” excludes petroleum and natural gas. Id. § 9601(14)(F).
41. Morrison Enters., LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 608 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Minnesota v. Kalman W. Abrams Metals, Inc., 155 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 1998)); see 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23)–(24) (defining “removal” and “remedial action”).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(D).
43. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C). See generally 2 KAREN A. GOTTLIEB, TOXIC TORTS PRACTICE
GUIDE § 25:8 (Fall 2019 ed.).
44. See Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA: Failures,
Lessons Learned, and Alternatives, 38 N.M. L. REV. 409, 413 (2008).
45. See id. at 414 n.40 (collecting sources).
46. Alexandra B. Klass, CERCLA, State Law, and Federalism in the 21st Century, 41 SW.
L. REV. 679, 685 (2012).
47. Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 204–08.
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if there is “an imminent and substantial” threat to public health or the environment posed by a current or potential release. 48 Third, CERCLA authorizes EPA to clean up the site itself, financed by the Superfund, 49 and then to
sue the PRPs to replenish the Superfund. 50 Fourth, a PRP may decide to
“voluntarily” clean up the site in anticipation of the government compelling
the PRP via litigation or settlement. 51
Fifth, and most relevant to this Note, a PRP may enter a settlement or a
consent decree with the government, agreeing to do all or part of a cleanup. 52
A common approach is for EPA to conduct an initial investigation and then
threaten PRPs with lawsuits, UAOs, or abatement actions. 53 This carrot-andstick approach works because CERCLA lawsuits and UAOs are incredibly
hefty sticks, 54 while settlements are chock full of carrots, such as contribution
protection (also known as the “settlement bar”), 55 covenants not to sue (i.e.,
releases of liability), 56 and causes of action for suits against other PRPs. 57
CERCLA does limit how generous the government can be. For example, the
government cannot release a PRP from future liability until the president
certifies that PRP has cleaned up satisfactorily. 58 Settlements are now EPA’s
preferred approach “[b]ecause [they] cost far fewer taxpayer dollars than

48. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a); accord Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 114 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Env’t Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 217 n.25 (3d Cir. 2010).
EPA tends to use UAOs more than filing an abatement action in court because they are
powerful tools. See Pidot & Ratiff, supra note 26, at 206 n.77, 207 (discussing lack of judicial
review for, and fines of, UAOs).
49. I.R.C. § 9507; 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). Using the Superfund to finance cleanups used to
be EPA’s preferred method. Ian G. John, Note, Too Much Waste: A Proposal for Change in the
Government’s Effort to Clean Up the Nation, 70 IND. L.J. 951, 965 (1995). However, the tax
expired in 1995 and the fund ran out of money eight years later, leaving EPA with overall fewer
funds that Congress appropriates. See Cartwright, supra note 19, at 300–01.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). Besides the tax, the Superfund is funded by recovery
from CERCLA suits brought by the United States. See I.R.C. § 9507(b)(2).
51. Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 208–09.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622. While settlements and consent decrees are of different legal
character, Courtney R. McVean & Justin R. Pidot, Environmental Settlements and
Administrative Law, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 191, 199–201 (2015), they do not differ in ways
significant to this Note. As such, it refers to both of them interchangeably.
53. Gaba, supra note 8, at 124.
54. See supra note 48 (discussing UAOs and abatement actions); infra note 73 and
accompanying text (discussing lawsuits).
55. Joanna M. Fuller, Note, The Sanctity of Settlement: Stopping CERCLA’s Volunteer
Remediators from Sidestepping the Settlement Bar, 34 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 219, 227, 245, 248
(2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
56. Fuller, supra note 55, at 248; see 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). In fact, EPA has restructured its settlements to make
sure settling PRPs have this cause of action available based on recent case law. Gaba, supra note
8, at 124 n.33.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(3).
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EPA-led cleanups, reduce litigation risks, and promote cooperation between
the EPA and PRPs.” 59
There are different ways to structure these settlements, and the distinctions are subtle but key. Namely, the different configurations focus on the
sequencing of a PRP’s obligations and benefits. On one hand, the PRP could
first have to finish cleaning up before EPA is bound by its covenant not to
sue the PRP anymore. 60 This structure makes completely cleaning up the
condition precedent for the covenant because the cleanup is “[a]n act or
event . . . that must exist or occur before a duty to perform something promised arises.” 61 On the other hand, EPA could bind itself not to sue immediately, with that obligation disappearing later if the party fails to clean up. 62 In
this case, cleaning up is the condition subsequent to the covenant because
the failure of a cleanup is “[a] condition that, if it occurs, will bring something else to an end.” 63 Finally, EPA could make the covenant unconditional. 64 In theory, EPA is bound immediately to not sue the PRP, and that
obligation never ends. Of course, if the PRP fails to clean up, EPA could sue
for a breach of contract. 65 Very few courts use this contract terminology. 66
However, classifying various CERCLA settlements among these categories is
crucial to understanding the problems with current interpretations of
CERCLA and the validity of this Note’s bright-line rule. 67
The upshot of this Section is that CERCLA liability is broad. A large
number of parties, even those tangentially associated with a hazardous-waste
site, can be liable for massive amounts of damages, and the government has
numerous ways to enforce this liability regime.
B. The CERCLA Causes of Action
This Section discusses the two causes of action parties can use to seek
the monetary damages recoverable under CERLCA: cost recovery and con-

59. Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 205.
60. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 204 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen the
[PRPs] completed performance of their obligations under the [settlement] . . . the conditional
covenants not to sue contained therein went into effect.” (emphasis added)).
61. Condition Precedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
62. See, e.g., ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“[S]o long as [the PRP] funds the Custodial Trust Accounts, it is released from liability . . . .”
(footnote omitted)).
63. Condition Subsequent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61.
64. See, e.g., Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 769 (6th Cir.
2014).
65. See id. at 768–69.
66. But see Fla. Power Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 810 F.3d 996, 1017–18 (6th Cir. 2015)
(Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting) (classifying covenants not to sue in various CERCLA settlements
as conditions precedent or subsequent).
67. See infra Parts II–III.
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tribution. 68 Each remedy is distinct and operates in different procedural circumstances. 69 In that vein, every circuit to address this issue has found that
cost recovery and contribution are mutually exclusive causes of action. 70
A cost-recovery action is available to anyone who has incurred costs in
cleaning up a contaminated site. 71 Recovery is limited only to costs a party
spent actually cleaning up a site; money paid for settlements or judgments is
excluded. 72
Cost recovery is a powerful tool. CERCLA is often described as imposing liability that is strict, joint, several, and retroactive, despite all of those
words being absent from the statute. 73 In the “seminal opinion” on the issue, 74 a district court adopted a common law approach when interpreting
CERCLA liability as such, 75 which now all federal courts follow. 76 Using
those traditional notions of common law, courts apply joint and several liability when the harm is indivisible. 77 And when there is a reasonable method
to divide the harm, courts apportion it among the PRPs. 78 Regarding strict

68. Some courts call cost-recovery actions “ ‘section 107(a)’ action[s],” and the two
types of contribution actions either section 113(f)(1) actions or “ ‘section 113(f)(3)(B)’
action[s],” respectively. See, e.g., Gov’t of Guam v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 3d 74, 77 n.1
(D.D.C. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 950 F.3d 104 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Gaba, supra note 8, at
133. This Note uses the “cost-recovery” and “contribution” labels. However, contribution
actions have two separate sufficient triggers. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), (3)(B). This Note
focuses mostly on the trigger in section 113(f)(3)(B).
69. United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 138–39 (2007) (quoting Cooper
Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 n.3 (2004), and Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y.
v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 2005)).
70. ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017) (collecting
cases).
71. Atl. Rsch., 551 U.S. at 136. Recall that a “person” includes private and governmental
entities. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not have to
be a PRP; an innocent party can clean up and then sue any PRP. Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d
190, 201 (7th Cir. 2013).
72. Atl. Rsch., 551 U.S. at 139 (“Rather, [that money] reimburses other parties for costs
that those parties incurred.”).
73. See, e.g., ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 73 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1288 (D. Mont.
2014) (“CERCLA is a unique and powerful statute, imposing strict and joint and several
liability on countless parties for contamination reaching back to the Nineteenth Century.”),
vacated on other grounds, 866 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2017); Superfund Liability, supra note
20. Ironically, the statute’s drafters actually struck those words from an early version of
CERCLA because joint and several liability proved too controversial. Pidot & Ratliff, supra
note 26, at 216. But a key drafter suggested that instead “issues of liability not resolved by
[CERCLA], if any, shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law.”
126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
74. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613 (2009).
75. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
76. Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 613–14 (collecting cases).
77. E.g., Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810.
78. See, e.g., Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 614 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433A(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1965)).
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liability, CERCLA adopts the standard of liability used in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. 79 Courts have also interpreted that Act as imposing
strict liability, so that standard is imputed to CERCLA. 80
Where cost recovery is blunt and harsh, contribution claims are flexible
and less severe. Contribution claims are designed to “promote quicker and
fairer settlements, decrease litigation, and facilitate cleanups.” 81 They do so,
in part, by providing courts broad discretion to use equitable factors to allocate costs between PRPs, unlike the much harsher standard of its costrecovery cousin. 82 Besides a different standard of liability, contribution
claims have other procedural differences from cost-recovery claims. First,
there is contribution protection: a PRP that has resolved liability with the
federal or state government cannot be sued via contribution. 83 But a PRP
that settled with the government is still vulnerable to a cost-recovery action. 84 Second, the statutes of limitations differ. A cost-recovery action expires three years after the completion of a removal action or six years after a
remedial action, 85 whereas contribution actions must be brought within
three years of the date of judgment or settlement. 86
There are two triggers sufficient to bring a contribution action. First, a
PRP may bring a contribution claim during or following a UAO, abatement
action, or cost-recovery action. 87 This claim essentially functions as a way for
a defendant facing one of the aforementioned actions to crossclaim or counterclaim against other PRPs. 88 Second, a PRP may seek contribution from

79. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32).
80. Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 210 n.102; see also Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 805.
81. Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA
Actions, 41 ENV’T L. 1045, 1070 (2011).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). While the statute does not require any particular test,
courts generally use one of two types of tests, known as the Gore factors or Torres factors.
Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 259.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). This provides a powerful incentive to settle and thus serves as
a specific example of how contribution fits into CERCLA’s overall scheme of promoting
cleanups. See Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 213–14.
84. United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 138–39 (2007). Commentators have
lambasted the policy implications resulting from this particular portion of this case. See infra
notes 225–232 and accompanying text.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2). The policy justification behind the shorter statute of
limitations for contribution actions is “to ensure that the responsible parties get to the
bargaining—and clean-up—table sooner rather than later.” ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
866 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting RSR Corp. v. Com. Metals Co., 496 F.3d 552, 559
(6th Cir. 2007)).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3). For additional differences between cost-recovery and
contribution actions, see Gaba, supra note 8, at 127–29.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166
(2004) (“The natural meaning of [section 113(f)(1)] is that contribution may only be sought
subject to specified conditions, namely, ‘during or following’ a specified civil action.”).
88. As a hypothetical, imagine three PRPs—M, N, and O—who caused 60, 10, and 30
percent of the contamination at a site, respectively. M cleans up all the waste and brings a cost-
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other PRPs if it has “resolved its liability to the United States or a State for
some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action
in an administrative or judicially approved settlement.” 89 But CERCLA does
not define what it means to “resolve” liability. 90 This absence undergirds a
circuit split. Specifically, the split is over what a settlement between the government and a PRP needs to contain to resolve liability and trigger the availability of a contribution action.
II.

AN UNRESOLVED CIRCUIT SPLIT

This Part analyzes the circuit split that emerged over what it means to
“resolve” liability with the government in order to trigger the availability of a
contribution action. This Part starts with the most popular position, adopted
by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. Those courts have held that settlements
most likely do not resolve liability if they include nonadmission of liability or
if the covenant not to sue goes into effect only after a party finishes cleaning
up. 91 In other words, if cleaning up is the condition precedent to the covenant not to sue, liability is not resolved. 92 This Part then discusses the Ninth
Circuit’s test that liability must be determined with “certainty and finality” in
order to be resolved. 93

recovery action against N. Technically, M might be able to recover all of the cleanup costs even
though it caused the majority of the pollution given that cost-recovery liability is strict, joint,
and several. Given that this is now “during” a cost-recovery action, one of the triggers for a
contribution claim has been met, so N can file a contribution counterclaim so that it is not
unfairly stuck footing the entire bill for a problem that it caused the least of. Likewise, it can
crossclaim to rope in O, who likewise caused significantly more of the problem than N.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
90. Gov’t of Guam v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 74, 85 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d on other
grounds, 950 F.3d 104 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
91. See infra Section II.A.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 60–67.
93. See infra Section II.B. After this Note entered the publication process with the
Michigan Law Review, the D.C. Circuit entered the split with a new, third test. See Gov’t of
Guam, 950 F.3d 104. After dealing with one novel and two common threshold issues, see id. at
110–14, Guam addressed the merits with a heavily textualist analysis. See id. at 114–15. It held
that all a settlement needs to do to “resolve” liability is obligate a party to take some action that
is covered under the expansively broad definition of a response action—that is, a cleanup. Id. at
115–16. That definition includes “ ‘confinement’ of substances.” Id. at 116 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(24)). Thus, liability had been resolved given the settlement’s requirement that the PRP
design a system to contain contaminated water that had percolated through the hazardous
wastes. Id. Similar to this Note’s proposal, Guam’s approach seems to be a bright-line rule,
albeit with the line drawn elsewhere; thus, Guam is more consistent with CERCLA’s text,
structure, and policy than its sister circuits’ approaches. Cf. infra Part III. For a more detailed
factual and legal analysis of Guam, see Austin W. Manning, D.C. Circuit Follows Trend on
Non-CERCLA Settlements that Leaves Guam Footing $160M CERCLA Bill, MANKO GOLD
KATCHER FOX: LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.mgkflitigationblog.com
/guam_navy_superfund_Ordot_limitations_contribution_settlement_decree [https://perma.cc
/LWV8-DU2A].
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A. Conditions Precedent and Nonadmissions of Liability: The Sixth and
Seventh Circuits’ Approach
In Bernstein v. Bankert, 94 the Seventh Circuit established the most popular test: covenants not to sue that are conditions precedent and/or nonadmissions of liability are strong indicators that the PRP has not yet resolved
liability with the government. In that case, the company known as “EnviroChem” conducted waste-handling and disposal operations in a suburb of Indianapolis. 95 It shut down in 1982, leaving considerable pollution behind. 96
The pollution site was draining into a waterway that partially supplied Indianapolis’s drinking water. 97 EPA first issued a UAO to prevent drinking
supply contamination, and, with the pollution contained, EPA turned to assigning liability for actually cleaning up the site. 98 EPA and the PRPs entered
the first Administrative Order by Consent (AOC)—a type of settlement—
where the PRPs agreed to do two things: (1) conduct a study to analyze the
various cleanup options available and (2) form a trust to fund that study and
any subsequent cleanups. 99 Three years later, in a second AOC, EPA and the
PRPs agreed to further fund the trust. 100 Regarding the status of the PRPs’
liability, there were two important provisions, which were identical for both
AOCs: (1) cleaning up was the condition precedent for the PRP’s release of
liability because the release was not triggered until the cleanup was certified
complete by the EPA 101 and (2) the PRPs neither admitted nor denied liability. 102 The cleanup began, and, at the time of suit, EPA had not issued any
notice of approval. 103
The fund trustees filed a cost-recovery action against some PRPs and
their insurers who had not paid into the trust or fulfilled other obligations
under the AOCs. 104 The defendant PRPs moved for summary judgment on
statute of limitation grounds. 105 First, the district court found that the trustees could not bring a cost-recovery action; rather, contribution was their
only option. 106 Given that the statute of limitations for contribution had expired three years prior, the court granted the motion. 107

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

733 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2013).
Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 195.
Id. at 195–96.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 203–04.
Id. at 203, 207.
See supra text accompanying notes 60–67.
Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 197, 203–04, 207.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 198, 206–07.
Id.
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit broke up the first and second AOCs,
reaching different results for each. For the second AOC, the court looked to
the plain meaning of the word “resolved.” 108 It canvassed dictionaries and
court opinions to find the word’s meaning. 109 After its survey, the court defined “resolved” as when “[a]n issue . . . is decided, determined, or settled—
finished, with no need to revisit.” 110 Applying that standard, it was clear to
the court the parties had not “resolved liability”; even though the parties had
“settled” (one element of Bernstein’s definition of “resolve”), they had not
satisfied the other element (“no need to revisit”). The covenants not to sue
had not kicked in yet because the cleanup was ongoing. 111 Because the government could still sue until the condition precedent (i.e., complete cleanup)
had been met, liability had not been decided with finality. 112 That potential
to “revisit” the issue meant nothing had been “resolved.” However, a costrecovery suit was available because, while the trustees had not resolved liability, they had met the paradigmatic trigger for cost recovery: incurring costs
while cleaning up a site. 113
The court also addressed two counterarguments. First, the defendant
PRPs claimed that in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 114 the Supreme
Court held that cost recovery was only available for costs incurred “voluntarily.” 115 The court dismissed this argument by saying that the defendant PRPs
misread Atlantic Research’s interpretation of CERCLA, and, more importantly, there was no statutory basis for this distinction. 116 Second, as a
policy argument, the PRPs who had not settled claimed that this reading of
the word “resolved” discouraged settlements. They argued that the availability of a cause of action is the reason a PRP agrees to settle in the first place, so
its unavailability decreases a PRP’s desire to settle. 117 The court disagreed. Its
interpretation did not leave the trustees with no legal recourse; in the absence of a contribution action, a cost-recovery action was available. 118 Further, cost recovery has a longer statute of limitations, making it preferable to
contribution. 119 Moreover, if the availability of a contribution action were

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 210–11.
Id. at 211–12, 211 n.12 (collecting sources).
Id. at 211.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 207.
551 U.S. 128 (2007).
Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 208.
Id. at 208–10; see also Gaba, supra note 8, at 146.
Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 214.
Id.
Id.
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crucial to getting settlements, EPA could remove the condition precedent
and structure the covenants not to sue to kick in immediately. 120
Regarding the first AOC, the covenants not to sue had gone into effect,
so liability had been resolved. 121 Thus, the trustees could only bring a contribution action for the first AOC. But because the PRPs entered the AOC in
1999, the three-year statute of limitations ran in 2002, which the PRPs
missed by six years, and so that claim was time-barred. 122
Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit seems to have an inconsistent approach regarding this question. On one hand, in RSR Corp. v. Commercial Metals Co.,
it held that an agreement resolved liability where the covenant not to sue was
a condition precedent “even [though] the covenant . . . did not take effect
until the remedial action was complete.” 123 On the other hand, in cases following RSR Corp., Sixth Circuit panels adopted Bernstein’s logic and found
that conditions precedent do not resolve liability. In Florida Power Corp. v.
FirstEnergy Corp., the plaintiff utility company entered into two AOCs with
EPA in 1998 and 2003. 124 As in Bernstein and RSR Corp., cleaning up was the
condition precedent to the covenant not to sue. 125 In 2011, the utility sued
another company under both cost recovery and contribution. 126 The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the claim was timebarred because more than three years had passed since the most recent settlement. 127 The district court agreed and dismissed the case. 128
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found Bernstein “especially illuminating”
and noted that the structure of the settlement there resembled the one before
the court. 129 Next, the court distinguished RSR Corp. because it had not actually interpreted the various provisions of the consent decree at issue there. 130
In other words, the issue of whether the condition-precedent provisions resolved liability was not even before the court in RSR Corp. 131 The Sixth Circuit did have the chance to consider this issue in Hobart Corp. v. Waste
Management of Ohio, Inc. 132 There, the covenant went into effect immediate-

120. Id. EPA has since amended its model settlement to conform to Bernstein’s
requirements. Gaba, supra note 8, at 158 & n.216.
121. Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 204.
122. Id. at 207. A cost-recovery action was also unavailable because Bernstein, on a
matter of first instance for the Seventh Circuit, determined that if a contribution action is
available, it is the exclusive remedy. See id. at 206; see also supra text accompanying note 70.
123. 496 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 2007).
124. 810 F.3d 996, 998–99 (6th Cir. 2015).
125. Fla. Power, 810 F.3d at 1003–04; supra text accompanying notes 60–67.
126. Fla. Power, 810 F.3d at 999.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 1002.
130. Id. at 1007.
131. Id.
132. 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2014).

October 2020]

Resolving "Resolved"

219

ly. 133 There was no condition that would end the government’s obligation
not to sue. The PRP was released from liability right away. As such, the court
concluded that liability had been resolved. 134 Florida Power combined Bernstein, Hobart Corp., and RSR Corp. to distinguish between covenants that go
into effect immediately to potentially be undone by a condition subsequent
and those that are later triggered by a condition precedent. 135
The Florida Power dissent’s main critique was that the distinctions the
majority drew did not matter. The dissenting judge attacked the claim that
there was a reasonable distinction between covenants that were immediately
effective versus ones that would be triggered later, concluding that it “does
not represent a rational basis for deciding which settlement agreements give
rise to a contribution action.” 136 Additionally, the dissent also critiqued the
court for giving weight to nonadmissions of liability. 137
The flaws in Bernstein’s logic operate at the textual, statutory, and policy
levels. Starting at the smallest unit of analysis, the plain meaning of the word
“resolve” that the court articulated is incomplete. The court heavily cited
past cases where “resolved” meant “someone was found liable.” 138 Courts’
main job is to resolve cases by adjudicating them and assigning liability. But
by focusing solely on courts, Bernstein ignored half of the definition it pulled
from the dictionary. Though resolving something can mean “ ‘[t]o answer (a
question),’ ” 139 it can also mean to “ ‘settle or find a solution to (a problem,
dispute, or contentious matter).’ ” 140 At a general level, the problem in any
CERCLA dispute is that EPA says a PRP is liable and the PRP disagrees, either on the existence or the amount of liability. This problem can be solved
without PRPs admitting their liability or having a court conclusively decide
they are liable. 141 The court’s selective use of dictionary definitions is also
wrong in another sense. “Admission” and “resolve” have different defini-

133. Hobart Corp., 758 F.3d at 769.
134. Id.
135. Fla. Power, 810 F.3d at 1007–09; supra text accompanying notes 60–67.
136. Fla. Power, 810 F.3d at 1019 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1016.
138. Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 211–12 (7th Cir. 2013) (collecting sources). For
example, a cited case found the “question of liability was ‘resolved’ by the district court’s
determination . . . that the defendant was liable.” Id. (citing Guzman v. City of Chicago, 689
F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2012)).
139. Id. at 211 n.12 (alteration in original) (citing Resolve, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(June 2020), www.oed.com/view/Entry/163733 (on file with the Michigan Law Review)).
140. Id. (quoting Resolve, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (Angus Stevenson &
Christine A. Lindberg eds., 3d ed. 2010)).
141. By way of analogy, imagine two roommates have a disagreement. X thinks the
apartment is too hot and thus leaves the window open, while Y thinks the apartment is too
cold. Y gets a thick blanket and is now comfortable in the apartment with the window open.
They have “resolved” their differences without actually having either: (1) a neutral third party
(an RA, for example) weigh in on what the right temperature is or (2) X or Y admit that their
individual temperature preference was incorrect.
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tions. 142 The former focuses on someone stating that they have done something wrong, while the latter is merely finding an acceptable solution to a
problem, without any mention of self-assigning misdeeds. 143 Bernstein conflates the two by requiring an admission to achieve a resolution.
Even if one grants this myopic definition, Bernstein does not apply it
correctly. The court said liability is resolved when there is no need to revisit
that issue. 144 Its logic was that making the completed cleanup a condition
precedent to the covenant not to sue meant a “revisiting” could still happen
because the government could sue at any time until the cleanup was complete. But Bernstein’s solution has the same problem. The court said that if
the covenant not to sue became a condition subsequent—meaning that the
government’s commitment to not sue took effect before cleanup was complete—that would resolve liability. 145 But in fact, there could still be a need to
revisit a condition-subsequent settlement. If the party fails to clean, then the
covenant is no longer in effect and the government could file a suit, thereby
revisiting the issue. 146 Further, even an unconditional covenant not to sue
does not end things; if a party violates that settlement, then the government
will sue for breach of contract. 147 Overall, there is no satisfying justification
for making the availability of a contribution claim hinge on a condition subsequent versus precedent; no matter how you structure a settlement, one
party could always fail to live up to its obligations and require litigation to
revisit the issue. 148
Bernstein’s definition of “resolved” also leads to four serious inconsistencies across the whole of CERCLA, violating the maxim to read statutes as a
whole. 149 First, CERCLA provides that participation in a settlement cannot

142. See Fla. Power, 810 F.3d at 1016–17 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting) (“Admitting
liability is not the same as resolving liability.”).
143. Compare Admission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61, with Resolve,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61.
144. Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 211.
145. Id. at 213–14.
146. See Fla. Power, 810 F.3d at 1018 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting). For a case where
litigation had to “revisit” an issue from a settlement, even though the covenant not to sue was a
condition subsequent, see, for example, NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d
682, 689, 692 (7th Cir. 2014).
147. Fla. Power, 810 F.3d at 1018 n.10 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting). For cases where the
government sued for breach of contract, see, for example, Hobart Corp. v. Waste Management
of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 769 (6th Cir. 2014), and Refined Metals Corp. v. NL Industries, Inc.,
No. 1:17-cv-02565-SEB-TAB, 2018 WL 4592110, at *5–6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 2018).
148. See Fla. Power, 810 F.3d at 1019 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting). While EPA could
solve this problem by changing the drafting of agreements, see Gaba, supra note 8, at 158, there
is no basis in law to require this solution in the first place.
149. See United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 135 (2007); see also Nina A.
Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive
Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71, 101 (2018) (noting the
importance of the whole act canon).
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be considered an admission of liability. 150 It is odd to say that a PRP need not
worry about being found liable for attempting to resolve liability with the
government, but then to force them to admit liability to find that resolution. 151 Second, EPA cannot forfeit its ability to sue unless the president certifies that the cleanup was completed satisfactorily. 152 Yet Bernstein would
take that requirement from section 122 and essentially graft it onto section
113(f)(3)(B), where that language is not found at all. 153 Third, besides simply
being strange, such a requirement would make a contribution claim impossible. The statute of limitations for a section 113(f)(3)(b) claim begins to run
when the PRPs enter settlement. 154 Given that cleanups often take years, 155
Bernstein means that one’s contribution action is not available until several
years after the statute of limitations has expired. 156 That result is incongruous. 157
Fourth, and finally, Bernstein might require a PRP to change its claim
midsuit. Recall that every circuit, including the Seventh in Bernstein, agrees
that contribution and cost recovery are mutually exclusive. 158 But consider
this scenario: The plaintiffs in Bernstein commence with their cost-recovery
action. During the litigation, the plaintiffs finish cleaning up and get certification, and then the covenants kick in. 159 What happens next is unclear. Potentially, the cost-recovery action is left unscathed—despite now being
technically invalid. Maybe it gets converted into a contribution action. If neither happens, plaintiffs could become vulnerable to a dispositive motion for
their cost-recovery claim because they now have a contribution action,
which is mutually exclusive with cost recovery. If they tried to file a brandnew contribution action, the three-year statute of limitations has likely
passed. This irregularity—which this Note terms “claim slippage”—creates a
glaring hole in how the two causes of action interact.
Bernstein’s reading is also counter to the policy undergirding section
113(f)(3)(B): encouraging settlements. 160 The court said its reading achieved
150. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(B).
151. See Gaba, supra note 8, at 157–58.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(3).
153. Gaba, supra note 8, at 158.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B).
155. E.g., Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 195.
156. ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108, 1124 n.8 (9th Cir. 2017).
157. ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 73 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1288 (D. Mont. 2014)
(“Neither the law nor common logic supports the concept that a statute of limitations could
run on a claim that has not yet accrued.”), vacated on other grounds, 866 F.3d 1108.
158. ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1117 (collecting cases).
159. This scenario is not out of the realm of possibility given that often one of the only
things that takes longer than cleaning up a Superfund site is litigating over it. Compare
ASARCO, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1291 (remarking that CERCLA is known as “the lawyer
employment act”), with Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 195 (describing a cleanup in New
Jersey anticipated to take six years).
160. See Kilbert, supra note 81, at 1070.
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CERCLA’s goals by still giving the trustees a cause of action—the better
one. 161 But Bernstein confused contribution’s means—settlement—with its
ends—ensuring sites actually get cleaned. 162 Though it is true that Bernstein
still gives parties a cause of action, which is an incentive to settle, it undermines the end of cleanup. Under Bernstein, PRPs are disincentivized from
actually fulfilling their obligations under a settlement with EPA because if
they clean up a site, they lose the very cause of action that Bernstein grants. 163
Further, Bernstein shifts more private-party CERCLA cases to cost recovery
rather than contribution, which commentators view as the incorrect direction. 164
B. “Certainty and Finality”: The Ninth Circuit’s Approach
To “resolve” liability in the Ninth Circuit, the PRP and the government
must have determined liability with “certainty and finality.” 165 In ASARCO
LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the plaintiff ASARCO operated a lead smelter
in Montana from 1888 to 2001. 166 The Anaconda Mining Company, the predecessor of the defendant Atlantic Richfield, operated a zinc fuming plant in
the same area. 167 After over a century of production, the area was heavily
polluted with hazardous waste. 168 In 1998, the United States brought claims
against ASARCO under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) 169 and the Clean Water Act 170 (instead of CERCLA), and ASARCO
and the United States entered their first consent decree. 171 ASARCO failed to

161. See supra text accompanying notes 117–119.
162. See Kilbert, supra note 81, at 1070.
163. As a hypothetical, imagine two settling PRPs. E just received certification that it
cleaned up well enough. E now loses its cost-recovery claim, because it is mutually exclusive
with contribution. See supra text accompanying note 70. Meanwhile, F has not yet received
certification that it cleaned up well, but it has spent money cleaning up. So, F has a costrecovery claim. See supra text accompanying note 71. Bernstein says that E’s reward for its
certifiably good behavior is the weaker cause of action. F’s “reward” is the stronger cause of
action, even though F has not yet proven itself. Further, contribution protection only bars
contribution claims. So, (the questionable PRP) F can sue (the good actor) E, while the good
actor has no cause of action against the questionable one (initially at least—there is the
contribution counterclaim). Note that this particular scenario is not rare; in fact, “the private
plaintiff in a [cost-recovery] case may be one of the most significant, if not the most significant,
contributor to contamination at the site.” Kilbert, supra note 81, at 1075.
164. See infra notes 225–232 and accompanying text.
165. ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108, 1124 (9th Cir. 2017).
166. Id. at 1114.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
170. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.
171. See ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1114. The settlement only dealt with claims for civil
penalties. Id. at 1126. The United States reserved its rights, multiple times, to sue for claims
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meet its obligations under that 1998 decree and filed for bankruptcy in
2005. 172 In 2009, ASARCO and the United States entered a new consent decree that established a trust fund to oversee the cleanup, into which
ASARCO paid nearly $100 million. 173 The new 2009 decree had a covenant
not to sue that was effective immediately, conditioned on ASARCO fulfilling
its obligations. 174
On June 5, 2012, exactly three years later, 175 ASARCO brought a contribution action against Atlantic Richfield. 176 Atlantic Richfield moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations had begun to run
with the 1998 decree and thus ASARCO’s claim had expired over a decade
earlier. 177 The district court held that the 1998 RCRA decree did trigger the
availability of ASARCO’s CERCLA contribution claim and dismissed the
claim for being untimely. 178 On appeal, the case presented three issues of first
impression for the Ninth Circuit, two of which waded into a circuit split. 179
As a preliminary matter, the court held “that a non-CERCLA settlement
agreement may form the necessary predicate for a § 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action.” 180
Having determined that a non-CERCLA agreement could trigger a contribution action, the court then considered whether either the 1998 Decree
or the 2009 one in fact did. The court zeroed in on the same issue that the
Seventh Circuit did in Bernstein: “[I]s [a PRP’s] liability ‘resolved’ where the
government reserves certain rights, or where the party refuses to concede liability?” 181 The court answered this question by saying liability is “resolved”
when “a settlement agreement . . . determine[s] a PRP’s compliance obligations with certainty and finality.” 182 It reached this conclusion by citing both
dictionaries, including some of the same ones that Bernstein cited, 183 and
Bernstein’s own summation of the varying judicial definitions of “re-

related to responses actions or their costs. Id. This distinction turned out to be crucial for the
disposition of this case. See infra notes 196–197 and accompanying text.
172. ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1114–15.
173. Id. at 1115.
174. Id. at 1128. This was a condition subsequent, even if the court did not use those
words. See supra text accompanying notes 60–67.
175. Remember that contribution actions have a three-year statute of limitations. 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3).
176. ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1115.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1113; see also Eric A. Rey, CERCLA Contribution: Ninth Circuit Addresses Two
Circuit Splits, 18 PRATT’S ENERGY L. REP. 3, 3 (2018).
180. ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1120–21.
181. Id. at 1122–23.
182. Id. at 1124 (emphasis added).
183. Compare id. at 1122, with Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 210–11 n.12 (7th Cir.
2013).
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solved.” 184 Despite using common sources, the ASARCO court disagreed
with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ conclusion. 185
The ASARCO court first argued that because the president has to sign
off on every cleanup before a covenant not to sue can go in effect, “it is unlikely that a settlement agreement could ever resolve a party’s liability.” 186
Second, the ASARCO court pointed out the problem of claim impossibility 187: it would defeat CERCLA’s purpose to have the statute of limitations
begin to run before the claim is even available. 188 Third, the ASARCO court
discussed legislative history. A House committee had identified a goal of using contribution as a settlement incentive, while at the same time expressing
distaste for EPA’s use of releases of liability as settlement incentives because
the releases undermined public health and the environment. 189 Under the
Bernstein court’s reading, the House supposedly wanted contribution to be
available without any releases of liability but wrote a statute requiring the
two to be together. According to the ASARCO court, this result would be illogical. 190 Fourth, the ASARCO court noticed the mismatch between requiring a party to admit liability and statutory purpose. SARA’s purpose was to
encourage settlement and quick cleanups. 191 Whether or not a PRP admits
liability has nothing to do with either of those goals. 192 In fact, requiring an
admission could potentially discourage settlements because admitting liability opens a PRP up to a cost-recovery action, 193 for which there is no contribution protection. 194
Having determined that liability is resolved when the settlement determines a PRP’s obligations with “certainty and finality,” 195 the court went on
to apply this standard to the two settlements between ASARCO and the government. The 1998 RCRA settlement did not resolve liability for a response
action. 196 Because liability had not been resolved, no contribution claim at-

184. ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 211).
185. Id. at 1124.
186. Id. The court was unclear why exactly this would never happen; potentially there is
an unstated assumption that presidential certification is rare.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 154–157.
188. ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1124 n.8.
189. Id. at 1125 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 1, at 80 (1985)).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607).
194. United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 140 (2007).
195. ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1124.
196. Id. at 1125. That release was only for civil penalties. Id. at 1126. In fact, the court
sounds almost exasperated recounting the number of times that the liability release was
cabined not to include cleanup costs or actions. See id. (“Lest there be any doubt, the Decree
makes the point at least three more times.”).
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tached, nor could the statute of limitations have expired on a nonexistent
claim. 197
But the 2009 CERCLA settlement did resolve liability. 198 The ASARCO
court cited several elements of the settlement that satisfied this new “certainty and finality” test. First, the covenant not to sue went into effect right
away. 199 Second, the reservation of rights only allowed suits for future acts
that create liability. 200 Thus, using an implicit expressio unius argument, the
court determined that because the 2009 Decree said the government could
sue only for future acts, all current or past acts had been resolved with certainty and finality. 201 Third, the Decree capped ASARCO’s total financial obligations at a specific amount. 202 Fourth, ASARCO received contribution
protection, which is further evidence that a PRP intended to resolve liability. 203 As a result, ASARCO had a contribution claim available, which it
timely filed on the last possible day before the statute of limitations expired. 204 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district
court for disposition on the merits. 205
The problem with ASARCO is that it creates an unclear standard that
does not seem to practically differ from the Bernstein standard. ASARCO did
not define the phrase “certainty and finality” in more detail than discussed in
this Section. Some observers have tried to provide guidance for litigants, 206
but no court has provided a detailed analysis. 207 Even then, when one dives
into the particular facts of this split, it is not clear that there is that much disagreement. 208 In ASARCO, the covenant not to sue was effective immediate197. Id. at 1126.
198. Id. at 1128.
199. Id. Again, the court did not call this a condition subsequent, but it was one. See
supra text accompanying notes 60–67.
200. ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1128–29.
201. See id.; Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
61.
202. ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1129.
203. Id. (citing Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 768–69 (6th
Cir. 2014)).
204. Id. at 1115, 1127.
205. Id. at 1129. On remand, the district court awarded ASARCO over $28 million in
addition to prejudgment interest and attorney fees. ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 353 F.
Supp. 3d 916, 958 (D. Mont. 2018).
206. See, e.g., Rey, supra note 179, at 8; Whitney Jones Roy, Whitney Hodges & Alison N.
Kleaver, Ninth Circuit Weighs in on Circuit Split Regarding CERCLA Contribution Claims After
Settlement and the Statute of Limitation, ENV’T LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMM. NEWSL., Dec.
2017, at 3, 4–5.
207. In fact, the only real post-ASARCO interpretation of this standard happened when a
D.C. district court rejected it as a valid test to apply, and even then, the appellate court reversed
that ruling. See Gov’t of Guam v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d on
other grounds, 950 F.3d 104 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also supra note 93.
208. But see, e.g., Cooper Crouse-Hinds, LLC v. City of Syracuse, 16-CV-1201, 2018 WL
840056, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018) (“There is a great deal of inconsistency among the cases
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ly. As long as ASARCO fulfilled its obligations under the settlement, it would
be released from any response obligations. 209 That is squarely a condition
subsequent. 210 When the Seventh Circuit had a chance to visit the same issue, it interpreted Bernstein to mean the same thing: conditions subsequent
resolve liability. 211 Because both the Ninth and the Seventh Circuits’ tests
would lead to the same result in ASARCO, it is uncertain what “certainty and
finality” adds to the result. This leaves parties further in the dark, and confusion only further disincentivizes settlements. 212
III. THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE “RESOLVES” THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
This Note rejects both the hard-line approach of Bernstein and the openended standard in ASARCO. Instead, it proposes a liberal bright-line approach: any conditional or unconditional covenant not to sue resolves liability and triggers a section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action. This Part will
discuss how this bright-line rule is consistent with CERCLA’s text, structure,
and policy.
This bright-line reading of the word “resolved” reflects its plain meaning. Bernstein put too much weight on the “no need to revisit” portion of
“resolve” and not enough on the “to solve a problem” part. 213 Before a PRP
settles, its potential liability is nearly boundless. Given CERCLA’s joint and
several liability, the PRP could be found liable for all damages allowed under
CERCLA. In contrast, a settlement, whether conditional or not, “converts a
party’s ‘joint and several’ liability to a discrete set of requirements that define
the totality of the obligation of the settling party with respect to the matters
addressed in the settlement.” 214 Even if a party violates the agreement, the
subsequent suit will be about whether the party followed that agreement, rather than the complete gamut of CERCLA liabilities. In other words, the initial problem was determining the extent of the PRP’s liability, and the
settlement resolved that problem. To use Bernstein’s phrasing, a settlement,
even one with a condition precedent, largely sets the terms of the debate with
“no need to revisit.” 215 Relatedly, whether the PRP admitted liability is irrelevant in this analysis. Admitting or denying liability does not change the substance of a PRP’s obligations under the settlement. 216

addressing consent orders that conditionally resolve a PRP’s CERCLA liability and whether
those consent orders trigger the requirement to proceed under § 113(f)(3)(B).”); Rey, supra
note 179, at 3, 6.
209. ASARCO, 866 F.3d at 1128.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 60–67.
211. See NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 692 (7th Cir. 2014).
212. Kilbert, supra note 81, at 1069.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 138–148.
214. Gaba, supra note 8, at 157 n.212.
215. Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 211 (7th Cir. 2013).
216. See Gaba, supra note 8, at 158.
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The bright-line rule also solves the macro statutory problems that Bernstein’s reading poses. 217 First, if admission and resolution would no longer be
tied together, it would avoid conflict with section 122’s evidentiary ban on
using the existence of settlements to infer an admission of liability. Second,
the requirement that the president sign off on a cleanup is then no longer
improperly read as a requirement for a contribution action. Thus, section
122 would no longer be grafted onto section 113. Third, this reading solves
Bernstein’s claim-impossibility problem. If a covenant not to sue is itself
enough to trigger resolution, then a contribution claim is available right upon entering settlement. That time matches when the statute of limitations
begins to run and solves the disharmony of having the statute of limitations
run before the claim is even available. Fourth, there is no longer any claim
slippage. Currently, there is no statutory guidance as to what happens to a
PRP’s cause of action if liability is suddenly resolved midsuit. But here, because the rule ties resolution to the covenant’s existence and not its condition precedent or subsequent, liability will always be resolved presuit.
Although recent CERCLA case law has ignored policy concerns, 218 the
bright-line rule still supports CERCLA’s policy goals—in this case, to promote settlements. 219 Increasing settlements, which will lead to prompter
cleanups, is a worthy goal of both CERCLA and the judicial system writ
large. 220 A contribution claim is an incentive to settle, 221 and anything that
strengthens this incentive will further CERCLA’s goals. 222 Making this benefit more certain to PRPs ex ante is a way to strengthen it. 223 This bright-line
rule is administrable—the full inquiry is whether or not there is a covenant
not to sue—making contribution’s availability all but certain. 224
Additionally, this bright-line proposal would encourage private
CERCLA claimants to file contribution rather than cost-recovery claims—a

217. For an analysis of these problems, see supra text accompanying notes 149–159.
218. Gaba, supra note 8, at 138.
219. Kilbert, supra note 81, at 1070.
220. McVean & Pidot, supra note 52, at 206.
221. See supra text accompanying note 55.
222. Cf. Fuller, supra note 55, at 248 (describing how weakening a different settlement
incentive would decrease settlements).
223. Cf. id. (“Private parties benefit from . . . the certainty of entering into a negotiated
settlement . . . .”).
224. The same logic can apply also to contribution protection. Given that it is another
settlement incentive, see, e.g., id. at 248–49, strengthening it would promote CERCLA’s policy,
and making its availability more certain would strengthen it. Like a contribution action, the
settlement bar only covers PRPs that have “resolved” their liability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(3)(B),
(f)(2). Identical terms within different parts of the same statute are generally given similar
meaning. E.g., 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:6, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2020). Thus, covenants
not to sue bring a PRP under the settlement bar’s ambit—the same clarity-promoting rule as
for contribution actions.
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goal supported by the vast majority of commentators and legal scholars. 225
Mainly, they disfavor cost-recovery claims because giving private parties an
end-run around contribution protection (also known as the “settlement
bar”) vitiates much of CERCLA. Recall that United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. held that contribution protection gives settling PRPs immunity
from only contribution, not cost-recovery, actions. 226 Ex post, this holding
upset cases settled pre-Atlantic Research where PRPs thought they had already “bought their peace” 227 with CERCLA; ex ante, the now-incomplete
protection of the settlement bar disincentivizes settlement, both in the total
number and the average value of each. 228
The severity of this problem is contested. Atlantic Research said that its
holding would not “eviscerate” contribution protection because a settling
PRP sued for cost recovery could file a contribution counterclaim to trigger
equitable appointment. 229 Applying equitable principles, “a district
court . . . would undoubtedly consider any prior settlement [as part of] the
liability calculus.” 230 But a benefit of the settlement bar is immunity from
more CERCLA litigation, not just an advantage on the merits. 231 Further,
subjecting courts to more contribution counterclaims wastes judicial resources by forcing parties to undertake additional procedural moves and
merits arguments. 232 Granted, the proposals cited here solve this problem by
making a cost-recovery claim unavailable to a private party in the first instance, while the bright-line proposal would make contribution claims easier
to obtain—leading to fewer cost-recovery actions because the two are mutually exclusive. 233 Still, this bright-line reading of “resolved” would make contribution actions easily available, and the fewer private cost-recovery actions,
the better.
The bright-line approach makes it easier for settlements to resolve liability, but it does not impermissibly equate “resolve” with “settle.” 234 The vast

225. See, e.g., Kilbert, supra note 81, at 1069–77; Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 229–61.
226. 551 U.S. 128, 140 (2007).
227. Fuller, supra note 55, at 244.
228. Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 223. Settling PRPs are not just victims in this
scheme; there is a procedural machination for them to game the system as well. See Kilbert,
supra note 81, at 1079–80; Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 226.
229. Atl. Rsch., 551 U.S. at 140–42.
230. Id. at 142.
231. See Pidot & Ratliff, supra note 26, at 250 n.313.
232. Kilbert, supra note 81, at 1079–80.
233. See supra text accompanying note 70.
234. But see Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 463 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2006). The
court’s entire forty-four-word analysis essentially equated “resolving” with “settling.” See id. at
1204. This reading is wrong on its face. If Congress meant that simply “settling” is a sufficient
trigger for a contribution action, it would have used the word “settled” instead of “resolved.”
Cf. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 224, § 46:6 (“Different words used in the same . . . statute are
assigned different meanings . . . .”). This served more as a cursory way to find subject-matter
jurisdiction than an actual entry into this circuit split. See Atlanta Gas Light, 463 F.3d at 1203–
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majority of CERCLA settlements with the government will have covenants
not to sue; 235 so, most CERCLA settlements would, under the bright-line
rule, resolve liability. However, the covenants serve an additional function
that a settlement without them would not address. A covenant attempts to
end the whole dispute while also cabining the scope of any future dispute
that might arise from the PRP failing to meet an obligation under the settlement. That limited scope decreases the complexity of a potential CERCLA
suit should one reemerge between a PRP and the government. Given the cost
and complexity of contribution suits, 236 setting the terms of debate ahead of
time is crucial. So, tying covenants to the meaning of “resolved” will make a
resolution limit future complexity, which merely settling might not do. Further, Congress designed contribution suits to be easy to obtain and covenants not to sue harder. 237 So, an approach that brings the meaning of
“resolve” closer to “settle” is appropriate.
Likewise, though a bright-line rule makes it easier to resolve liability,
and so obtain a contribution action or the settlement bar’s protection, it does
not allow the government to provide undue sweetheart deals to polluters.
CERCLA has detailed procedures for how the United States can settle with
PRPs. 238 For example, a longer-term remedial action must be entered as a
consent decree and judicially approved. 239 The agency must also run a proposed settlement through a notice-and-comment procedure where it must
“consider any comments filed . . . in determining whether or not to consent
to the proposed settlement.” 240 These procedures allow courts to step in
when an agency oversteps its bounds 241—in this case failing to use CERCLA
to protect the environment.
CONCLUSION
In advancing its goal of cleaning up toxic waste sites on the polluter’s
dime, CERCLA plays with some high stakes: it reallocates billions of dollars
04. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has only cited Atlanta Gas Light for this proposition one other
time. See Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 2012). Moreover, none
of the cases in the actual split cite it, either. See supra Part II.
235. See Gaba, supra note 8, at 157 (“Resolution of liability with the United States is
generally expressed in CERCLA settlements by inclusion of a ‘covenant not to sue’ . . . .”).
236. Sean Murphy, Duck, Duck, Sued!—CERCLA’s Game of Contribution Tag, GEO.
ENV’T L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 27, 2019), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/environmental-lawreview/blog/duck-duck-sued-cerclas-game-of-contribution-tag/
[https://perma.cc/6DEAG6W2].
237. See supra text accompanying notes 189–190.
238. McVean & Pidot, supra note 52, at 206.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A).
240. Id. § 9622(i)(3). Other environmental statutes have similar notice-and-comment
provisions. McVean & Pidot, supra note 52, at 206–07.
241. See generally McVean & Pidot, supra note 52 (cataloging various types of settlement
agreements in the context of environmental protection and identifying how each category
allows for effective judicial review).
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while ameliorating the most acute public health crises and environmental
disasters. It is a complicated—often poorly drafted—statute that uses many
tools to reach its goals. One of these tools includes a cause of action for private parties who paid more than their fair share to recoup that overpayment.
But first that party must seek an apparently elusive resolution of its liability
with the government. Courts’ attempts to define the nature of this resolution
have polluted the statute, either by creating uncertainty for litigants or undermining its statutory scheme.
This Note responds by proposing a new bright-line reading: any covenant not to sue, conditional or otherwise, resolves liability and thus leads to a
contribution action. Overall, this rule would create administrable certainty
and bring statutory cohesiveness to CERCLA. For a complex statute that is
about the equally byzantine process of hazardous-waste remediation, it
would be fitting for CERCLA to be cleaned up with a simple solution.

